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1. Several decades of citizens’ engagement against corruption have yielded 
partial results in a few countries but corruption persists in many developing and 
emerging countries. It is particularly worrying that many significant anti-corruption 
campaigns have resulted in short-term mitigation but over the longer term, gains 
have often been partly or wholly reversed. An understanding of the different drivers 
of corruption can help to design better policy and achieve more sustainable results.  
2. Many anti-corruption efforts have been constrained by the fact that reform 
attempts have been driven by a simplified analysis of the causes of corruption in 
developing countries. The simplified analysis typically identifies transparency and 
accountability as general mechanisms for addressing corruption, together with some 
other general measures such as improvements in judicial processes, higher salaries 
for public officials and reductions in the discretionary activities of governments. 
Indeed, there are types of corruption that are particularly amenable to such 
measures. But there are many important types of corruption that have a different set 
of causes and these types of corruption are not adequately addressed by the 
instruments referred to above. Moreover, the attempt to assess the success of reform 
movements by observing their effects on aggregate indicators of corruption has 
resulted in disappointment with the limited outcomes achieved. It is therefore 
important to distinguish between different types of corruption and policy and reform 
instruments have to be designed to address these types of corruption separately. 
Moreover, reformers need to explain that success will not be achieved at the same 
pace for the different types of corruption. As a result, it is important to assess the 
success of reform efforts in a more refined way. Measuring outcomes with reference 
to general measures of corruption may be disappointing but measures of specific 
results achieved in ameliorating damage may be more appropriate and effective. 
Thus, a more effective approach is to target specific types of corruption and measure 
progress in particular areas. 
3. In the consensus view, corruption happens when public officials have the 
opportunity of making discretionary decisions and the costs of violating official 
regulations is low relative to the potential benefits. When these conditions hold, a 
public official may be tempted to violate official rules to make decisions that benefit 
particular individuals for a share of the benefits. If this was the primary driver of 
corrupt behaviour by public officials, the appropriate policy response would be a 
combination of policies to change the cost-benefit calculations of public officials. 
The relevant reforms would be those that increased the cost suffered by corrupt 
officials and the probability of punishment and reduced the potential benefits. 
Improvements in transparency and accountability serve to increase the probability of 
detection and punishment and thereby increase the expected costs of corruption. 
Improvements in legal processes increase the probability of effective punishment 
and have a similar effect. Increases in the salaries of public officials increase the 
lifetime cost of being apprehended and losing a stable income stream. Finally, 
reductions in the range of areas where public officials can take discretionary actions 
reduce the opportunities for easy corruption and indirectly raise the costs of 
corruption by requiring more risky activities to benefit from corruption. Much of the 
anti-corruption activities in developing countries over the last few decades have 
focused on one or more of these areas. 
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4. There is no doubt that for some government activities, particularly those 
associated with the provision of some services, this type of opportunistic corruption 
has important negative effects. Moreover, the types of reform that have been 
pursued have undoubtedly had a positive effect in reducing the impact of these types 
of corruption. However, while some types of corruption have been reduced, the 
general incidence of corruption has typically not come down in most countries in a 
sustained way. Temporary improvements in the overall levels of corruption have 
often been reversed. This experience suggests that there are other drivers of 
corruption that are not being addressed and that these types of corruption may also 
be quite difficult to address. Indeed, there are a number of other drivers of 
corruption that are recognized as important but policy has not been very effective in 
taking cognizance of the implications of these different drivers. Two in particular 
are important, and explain why developing countries and ex-socialist countries at 
different stages of transition tend to have higher levels of corruption overall. First, 
political corruption is more entrenched in developing countries for a number of 
structural reasons that are difficult to address in the short to medium term. Secondly, 
developing and transition countries tend to have a lower level of overall 
institutionalization, and the enforcement of property rights is typically relatively 
weak. In this context, corruption may also have structural drivers that are difficult to 
address in the short to medium term. If some generic types of corruption are 
difficult to eliminate immediately, it is important to have the tools of analysis to 
identify the most damaging types that need to be identified and addressed in a 
sequential way. 
5. Political corruption is widely recognized as an important type of corruption in 
developing countries. It is also generally assumed that this type of corruption can be 
addressed with transparency and accountability reforms because voters can be 
expected to punish corrupt politicians. However, experience shows that this is often 
not the case and corrupt politicians are often repeatedly re-elected even when their 
involvement in corruption is widely known. What is often ignored in policy 
discussions is that off-budget transfers and activities are an important part of the 
political process in most developing and some transition economies for reasons that 
have to do with the level of development of the economy and other structural factors 
that are not immediately subject to policy action. In developing and even in many 
middle income countries, the fiscal take of the government is limited due to the low 
average incomes of taxpayers and low levels of institutionalization that prevent 
dramatic increases in the tax take of government. In these contexts, it is difficult to 
sustain significant redistributive programmes and governments often struggle to 
maintain the necessary expenditures on infrastructure and salaries. In particular, the 
scale of redistributive and public good delivery programmes is typically insufficient 
to enable a political party to win an election simply on its promises of budget-based 
delivery to particular constituencies.  
6. This is a very significant difference from more advanced countries. In the 
latter, the fiscal take is typically big enough to sustain a budget-based programme of 
delivery that is attractive to a large enough number of voters to form a winning 
coalition. In contrast, in most developing countries, a political party is unlikely to 
win an election simply by identifying a fiscal programme of public goods delivery 
based on the available budget. The competition between parties is therefore to a 
large extent over identifying different coalitions to whom they can offer a 
combination of on-budget and off-budget benefits, with the latter playing a 
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significant role in the political calculations of political parties. A party that does not 
have an informal off-budget component in its political strategy of winning 
supporters is unlikely to win in an electoral competition. Off-budget activities refer 
to a wide variety of opportunities created for different categories of supporters of a 
party to acquire incomes through opportunities that are not formally processed 
through the budget. These can include at the highest level (for important financiers 
and supporters of the party) access to lucrative government contracts or informal 
political assistance in processes of land acquisition or mining rights. At lower levels 
of the political pyramid off-budget support can include overlooking or condoning 
illegal acts by important party supporters. At the lowest levels it can include cash 
handouts and other benefits offered to voters. Not every country has the same types 
and mix of off-budget activities, but most developing countries have significant 
levels of these off-budget activities. By definition, off-budget activities are informal 
if not illegal (and many such activities are illegal as well). All off-budget activities 
would fall under a broad definition of corruption as public officials are involved in 
discretionary activities that are privately beneficial to them and that are outside the 
remit of the formal activities allowed to public officials.  
7. The prevalence of political corruption based on these drivers raises a 
significant problem because these incentives are unlikely to be changed very 
significantly by greater accountability and transparency. Of course, accountability 
and transparency reforms can have some effect, but many aspects of political 
corruption operate openly in many developing countries and many well known 
corrupt politicians are repeatedly re-elected. It is important to understand why it is 
so difficult to address this type of corruption in the short to medium run. If parties 
need the support of powerful financiers and organizers to win, and if the latter in 
turn need to offer off-budget inducements and payments to their supporters, a party 
that steadfastly refused to engage in any of these activities would be unlikely to win 
an election. This is not always true, but is very often the case in contexts where 
there are insufficient fiscal resources to construct a winning election manifesto 
based on formal service delivery and transfers through the budget. The social 
consensus and enforcement capabilities that can prevent this from happening are 
only likely to be effective once powerful interests and organizations in a society are 
able to achieve their distributive goals based on on-budget policies.  
8. Clearly, political corruption is not just a feature of fiscally poor states, as we 
also see much evidence of this in natural resource rich developing countries which 
potentially have more significant fiscal resources. In these countries a related set of 
factors explain the prevalence of political corruption. If the fiscal resources of a 
country are not drawn from a broad base of productive enterprises and tax-paying 
individuals, it is difficult for a broad-based social constituency to hold the state to 
account. Resource rich developing countries where the productive sector is weakly 
developed therefore face a different type of problem. The existence of resource 
incomes without broad-based capabilities for holding the state to account can create 
incentives for a small group to control the state. It can often be feasible for the small 
group to use political corruption to induct a group of powerful individuals and 
groups in that society, and in particular the army, and share the available resources 
disproportionately within a narrower group. In both cases, the fundamental problem 
is the absence of a broad-based productive economy that is paying taxes and can 
hold the state to account. In countries where the productive sector is broad-based, 
political corruption is much more difficult to sustain, first because there is a 
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significant tax base on which a rule-following political party can win elections, and 
secondly, a broad taxpayer base ensures that taxpayers have the economic capability 
to hold politicians to account.  
9. In countries where political corruption is entrenched as a mechanism of 
political competition between parties, accountability and transparency reforms have 
a more limited impact on corruption. The question for public administration reform 
is what to do in these contexts? Political corruption not only has a negative effect 
for the development of accountability in politics, it makes it difficult to address 
other types of corruption. This is because the resources required for off-budget 
political activities often come from corruption carried out by state agencies, and in 
these cases bureaucrats act in collusion with and under the protection of political 
representatives. As a result of their political protection, it is typically very difficult 
to successfully prosecute important cases of bureaucratic corruption where the 
proceeds of the corruption contribute towards the political requirements of ruling 
parties or politicians. The experience of anti-corruption strategies in developing 
countries suggests that accountability and transparency reforms tend to be subverted 
when they confront political corruption. In the long run, the solution to political 
corruption is the growth in the taxpaying capabilities of a broad-based productive 
economy. This gradually increases the fiscal base that can support social democratic 
policies by political parties and results in a progressive shift from off-budget to on-
budget political competition between parties. The latter is a necessary precondition 
(though by no means sufficient) for a sustained reduction in the incidence of 
political corruption. Developing and transition economies are at different stages in 
this transition, and therefore the steps that are feasible for addressing political 
corruption are also somewhat different. The challenge is to have a realistic 
assessment of what can be achieved and to design and assess policies addressing 
political corruption from this perspective. 
10. A somewhat different driver of corruption is the weakness of institutions in 
developing and transition economies. The enforcement of formal institutions like 
property rights and contracts presumes that the state has sufficient enforcement 
capabilities and that the underlying property rights structures are sufficiently 
legitimate so that they do not face sustained contestation. These conditions typically 
do not hold in developing and transition economies. Developing countries often 
have limited fiscal resources to dedicate to enforcement. In addition, both 
developing and transition economies have the added problem that their emerging 
institutions and property rights are also rapidly changing. In such contexts, the 
emerging structures of property rights often lack immediate and wide legitimacy, 
though legitimacy tends to emerge over time if the new institutions and rights prove 
to be functional and beneficial for broad sections of the population. In this context, 
it is often difficult for firms and individuals to rely solely on the enforcement of 
their rights by formal state agencies, particularly given the limited enforcement 
capabilities of the latter. In many developing and transition countries, private or 
semi-informal enforcement of rights and contracts emerges and public officials and 
politicians often play a role outside their official jurisdictions in enforcing rights 
and contracts for an additional price. In some cases, non-state actors like mafias and 
political organizations can also be seen to be engaged in enforcement activities, 
again for a price.  
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11. Corruption associated with weak institutionalization thus has a different set of 
motivations and drivers. Firms or individuals who have to operate in these contexts 
often find that they have to engage in informal activities that can be described as 
corruption to protect their property rights and operate their businesses. The 
challenge from the public administration perspective is that there may be no viable 
strategy of improving the enforcement and legitimacy of property rights and 
institutions in the short to medium term given the scarcity of budgetary resources 
for enforcement and the weak legitimacy of emerging rights in the broader society. 
In these circumstances many firms and individuals can find that the only way to 
enforce their rights and contracts is by accepting the necessity of additional 
payments to public officials or even to non-state actors. For instance, it is a common 
observation in many developing and transitional economies that the support of 
enforcement agencies like the police, courts and other agencies involved in 
monitoring and enforcing contracts requires further informal expenditures. All these 
activities directly or indirectly involve the participants in corruption because the 
enforcement of rights and contracts through additional informal expenditures 
inevitably violates formal rules.  
12. These observations can sometimes be explained by the low salaries and 
incentives of public officials in poor countries. Sometimes this is indeed the case 
but where corruption is driven primarily by low salaries and incentives of public 
officials we have a very different driver of corruption. If in principle all property 
rights and contracts could be enforced but are not being enforced simply because of 
the low incentives of officials, the problem could be addressed with anti-corruption 
reforms that focused on the cost-benefit calculations of public officials, including 
increases in their salaries. However, if the problem is weak institutionalization, 
corruption is likely to continue even if public officials are relatively well paid. Here 
the problem is that the overall structure of institutions and property rights cannot be 
adequately enforced given the existing capacities of the state. This is ultimately also 
a resource problem but not one that is limited to the payment of adequate salaries 
and wages to public officials. Moreover, part of the problem could also be the 
relatively low level of social acceptance and legitimacy of emergent rights in some 
societies. As a result, individuals and firms are often induced to make extra 
payments to state and non-state actors to solve particular problems of enforcement. 
Clearly, in this case, corruption will not necessarily be solved (though it may be 
partially mitigated) by increasing the salaries of public officials, nor will the 
incentives change significantly as a result of greater transparency and 
accountability. The long-term solution in these cases requires a gradual 
improvement in the capacity of the state to enforce property rights and contracts in 
general. Policy can take some measures to improve enforcement capabilities 
immediately, but the quality and extent of overall enforcement does depend on the 
level of development determining the taxpaying capacities of the economy and the 
emergence of a broadly legitimate structure of rights and institutions in that society. 
13. Corruption related to weak institutionalization can have a range of 
implications depending on the underlying economy, the enforcement capabilities of 
the formal state, and the political motivations and incentives of the political 
leadership. As a result, the dominant types of political corruption can influence the 
types of corruption that are driven by weak institutionalization. In the most benign 
case, if political corruption involves a stable set of off-budget activities, businesses 
may take a long-term view of development and their enforcement activities may 
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support this objective. Developmental strategies on the part of businesses would be 
reinforced if in addition, the enforcement capabilities of the state were sufficient to 
enforce an adequate level of law and order and prevent serious predatory activities 
by state and non-state actors. Under these circumstances, the additional contract 
enforcement necessary as a result of weak institutionalization may not be very 
significant. In these contexts, political corruption and corruption related to weak 
institutionalization could coexist with high rates of economic growth and social 
development and the society could gradually make a transition to lower levels of 
corruption through institutional and political reforms. This is a pattern of transition 
that we see in cases of successful transition from underdevelopment and high levels 
of corruption to development and low levels of corruption.  
14. In contrast, in the most problematic cases, there can be a very adverse 
relationship between different types of corruption. If political competition between 
parties in a poor country is very intense and there is no basic compromise between 
competing political organizations, winner-takes-all strategies of political parties can 
force extreme short-termism in the calculations of those engaging in political 
corruption. In a context of weak institutionalization, the cost of doing business can 
become very high for businesses because of the high cost of protecting and 
enforcing their property rights and contracts. In the worst cases, businesses may 
abandon long-term productive investment strategies as infeasible and decide to use 
political connections and their ability to pay politicians to create monopolies, distort 
prices and essentially extract resources in unproductive ways from the rest of 
society. In extreme cases, these societies can begin a downward spiral of declining 
development. Here the challenges of addressing corruption are immediate and 
severe, but a reliance on transparency and accountability is insufficient for 
addressing these types of interrelated problems.  
15. Public policy for addressing corruption has to begin by recognizing the 
different drivers of corruption and assessing the dominant problems in different 
contexts. The incremental steps that a society needs to take to address corruption 
depend very much on identifying what can be feasibly achieved in that context and 
then focusing public energies on making what is feasible happen. The result may not 
be a measurable reduction of aggregate corruption and it is therefore very important 
not to define a reduction in aggregate corruption indicators as an immediate target. 
This is important in order to avoid demoralization and public exhaustion with anti-
corruption agendas. There is a role for anti-corruption policy packages that focus on 
the costs and benefits facing public officials contemplating corruption. Some types 
of corruption are indeed associated with cost-benefit calculations and in these cases 
public officials may perform better as a result of changes in their relative incentives. 
Policies focusing on accountability, transparency, salaries and punishments can 
constitute a package of anti-corruption reforms that can deliver these results in some 
sectors. For instance, these strategies may result in improvements by cutting down 
incentives for red tape and delaying tactics on the part of bureaucrats, and 
improving the delivery of some types of services. It is however, important to assess 
the outcomes of these strategies by measuring improvements in specific areas of 
service delivery rather than reductions in aggregate levels of corruption. The effects 
on aggregate corruption may be limited given that much of the corruption in a 
country may be political corruption or corruption associated with weak 
institutionalization.  
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16. Indeed, the importance of political corruption and weak institutionalization 
explains why overall corruption in many developing and transition economics 
persists after years of anti-corruption activities. On the one hand, long-run solutions 
to both political corruption and weak institutionalization are only likely to be 
achieved through the gradual development of broad-based productive capabilities 
and improvements in the tax take. On the other hand, in some of the most serious 
cases of political corruption and weak institutionalization, the developmental and 
social effects are so adverse that immediate steps need to be taken to mitigate the 
high social costs. However, incentive-based anti-corruption strategies that focus on 
greater transparency, accountability, public sector salaries and judicial reforms may 
not be sufficient for the reasons discussed earlier. These types of corruption can 
continue even with broad public knowledge of the sources of corruption and with 
the operation of democratic accountability as it operates in many developing and 
transition countries. The appropriate strategies for citizens and public administration 
reforms in these contexts therefore have to include other components. In particular, 
public pressure and institutional reforms have to be used to change some of the 
parameters that result in high social costs of these types of corruption. 
17. For instance, if political corruption is intense and is a zero-sum game between 
political parties, the social mobilization of citizens groups can be deployed to 
achieve some level of compromise between competing parties such that both 
governing and opposition parties can begin to take a longer view of their appropriate 
strategies. This may have a more dramatic effect on the damage caused by political 
corruption compared to attempts to directly reduce political corruption using 
available instruments. Similarly where weak institutionalization results in business 
and politics colluding to extract resources from the rest of society, there may be 
important things that citizens and reformers can do. For instance, business and 
influential citizens’ groups that are adversely affected can be better organized to 
demand changes in laws and enforcement to stop particular types of collusion that 
result in specific monopolies, acts of avoidance of regulations and so on. These 
steps can be combined with policy-driven support to strengthen the enforcement 
capacities of particular agencies that are critical in the particular areas that are being 
targeted, for instance agencies that are monitoring the quality of food imported, or 
agencies that are enforcing the rights of people displaced as a result of land 
acquisition strategies of governments. These examples are meant to demonstrate that 
the identification of priorities and enforcement capabilities has to be very specific to 
particular countries and periods and a blueprint approach will not work. Small steps 
to address some of the most damaging effects of corruption can yield more 
immediate and important results in countries that are most adversely affected and 
this should be seen as an important component of a broad anti-corruption strategy.  
18. The progress that has been made by citizen’s engagement in achieving greater 
transparency and accountability has been important in many countries but the 
challenge of tackling corruption remains serious in most developing and transition 
economies and even in a few advanced countries. Transparency and accountability 
are part of a package of strategies that work by changing the costs and benefits 
facing individual bureaucrats and politicians. However, it is necessary to recognize 
the systemic factors that drive political corruption and corruption driven by weak 
institutionalization. These are not easy to remove immediately but urgent steps are 
often required to mitigate some of their most damaging effects so that economic and 
social development can proceed. It is therefore important to augment the standard 
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incentive-based anti-corruption package with strategies that address the effects of 
the most damaging types of political corruption and corruption driven by weak 
institutionalization. We are then more likely to achieve more immediate 
improvements in some of the worst affected countries. In addition, it is important to 
measure the effects of anti-corruption policies by looking at discrete results in 
particular sectors and service delivery functions rather than the impact on overall 
corruption indicators. This is because it is likely that progress in reducing overall 
levels of corruption will be relatively slow in most developing and transition 
countries. However, the drive to address the damaging effects of corruption has to 
be sustained and this is easier to do if we focus on a series of sequential tasks. 
19. The note also sets out the strategic framework and scope of activities to be 
implemented for the period 2012-2013. The Committee is requested to review and 
provide feedback to the Secretariat on these activities, which are intended to assist 
Governments in addressing their current public governance and administration 
challenges and the emerging issues in a globalized world. 
